Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience by Grim, Patrick
Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience 
Author(s): Patrick Grim 
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly , Jul., 1983, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1983), pp. 
265-276  
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American 
Philosophical Publications  
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20014007
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide 
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and 
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at 
https://about.jstor.org/terms
and University of Illinois Press  are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend 
access to American Philosophical Quarterly
This content downloaded from 
             141.211.4.224 on Wed, 24 Feb 2021 20:57:37 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 American Philosophical Quarterly
 Volume 20, Number 3, July 1983
 III. SOME NEGLECTED PROBLEMS
 OF OMNISCIENCE
 PATRICK GRIM
 T}ACH of the traditional attributes of God
 -"comes with its own set of standard problems.
 The standard problems of omniscience are the
 following: (1) the difficulty of reconciling divine
 omniscience with human freedom;1 (2) questions
 closely related to (1) concerning truth and future
 contingents and God's knowledge and future con?
 tingents;2 and, as a poor third, perhaps, (3) some
 difficulties apparently posed by temporal index
 icals for the compossibility of omniscience and im?
 mutability.3
 The problems of omniscience that I want to ad?
 dress here are more generally neglected than these.
 One set of neglected problems consists of para?
 doxes of omniscience clearly recognizable as
 forms of the Liar, and these I have never seen
 raised at all. Other neglected problems ?although
 these are related to (3) above?are difficulties for
 omniscience posed by recent work on belief de se
 and essential indexicals.4 These have not yet been
 given the attention they deserve.
 My main purpose here is simply to introduce
 these as neglected problems?to make it clear that
 they are problems, and to suggest that they ought
 not be neglected. Let me add that I do regard these
 as serious challenges for doctrines of omnis?
 cience?problems of indexicals, for example, as
 indicated in a later section, seem clearly fatal to a
 notion of an all-knowing God. But I do not think
 that these difficulties show that absolutely
 anything recognizable as a notion of omniscience
 must be incoherent or impossible to define. A
 recognizable notion of omniscience and of an om?
 niscient God can be salvaged despite such dif?
 ficulties, though at a certain cost, and I will try to
 indicate how.
 In a first section I hope to straighten up some
 definitional clutter so as to facilitate the more in?
 teresting work that follows. In a second section I
 offer a series of paradoxes of omniscience, firmly
 in the tradition of the Liar, and in a third section I
 digress to consider similar paradoxes of possible
 worlds. In section IV, I present what I take to be
 the most plausible reply to these sets of paradoxes,
 and in section V, I consider some problems with
 that reply.
 All of that is on Liar-like paradoxes. In two
 final sections I raise and discuss some quite dif?
 ferent problems for omniscience posed by recent
 work on belief de se and essential indexicals.
 I. Preliminary Definitional Clutter
 What would it be to be omniscient? Quite often,
 being omniscient is glossed casually as being "all
 knowing" or as "knowing everything." Where
 somewhat more care is taken, the following is
 clearly the standard definition:
 Df. 1. x is omniscient = df for all p, p is true
 IFF x knows that p.
 This is, for example, Geach's definition, and is
 equivalent to definitions offered by Prior, Swin?
 burne, James F. Ross, William E. Mann, and
 others.5
 Omniscience in this standard sense certainly will
 not do, however, at least without supplement, as
 an adequate characterization of a traditional
 God's knowledge. What none of the philosophers
 listed above seems to have recognized is that a be?
 ing might be omniscient in the sense of Df. 1 and
 yet hold any number of false beliefs.
 For consider a being B with false beliefs plt
 p2,...pn. Since B cannot be said to know any of
 these, Df. 1 does not require that these beliefs of B
 be true. So as long as B also believes ?and
 knows ?all truths, he qualifies as omniscient on
 the standard definition despite his false beliefs.
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 What Df. 1 requires is that all truths be known by
 an omniscient being, and that all things known by
 such a being be true. Since falsehoods believed by
 such a being are neither truths nor things known
 by such a being, however, Df. 1 puts no effective
 restrictions on the false beliefs of an omniscient
 being.
 In order to qualify as omniscient and yet hold
 false beliefs, of course, a being B would have to
 hold contradictory beliefs. Given any false belief
 pk, B would also have to believe that "it is not the
 case that pk," since B knows ?and so of course
 believes ?all truths. Since an omniscient being is
 required to know all truths, moreover, such a be?
 ing would have to know that his beliefs were con?
 tradictory in such cases. But none of this shows
 that a being so flawed as to hold contradictory
 beliefs, or so flawed as to shamelessly recognize
 that he holds contradictory beliefs, would not
 qualify as omniscient in the sense of Df. 1. For
 nothing in that definition requires that an omnis?
 cient being avoid even blatantly obvious con?
 tradiction.
 If we are to say that God is omniscient in the
 sense of Df. 1 above, then, we will at least have to
 say something more as well; we will have to add
 that God holds no false beliefs, or that He is not
 only omniscient but also "omnirational" in a sense
 which excludes that possibility of contradictory
 beliefs.
 We might attempt, on the other hand, to revise
 the definition of omniscience itself so as to handle
 these difficulties. Df. 2, for example, might seem a
 simple but promising way of avoiding the danger
 of divine false beliefs:
 Df. 2. jc is omniscient = df for all p, p is true
 IFF x believes that p.6
 By replacing the "x knows" of Df. 1 with a mere
 "a believes," Df. 2 would insure that an omniscient
 being will hold no false beliefs. Precisely because
 of that replacement, however, Df. 2 raises dif?
 ficulties of its own. A being all of whose beliefs
 were acquired haphazardly or by chance, or on the
 basis of hearsay or rumor, and who continued to
 hold such beliefs out of mere whimsy or caprice,
 might nonetheless qualify as omniscient in the
 sense of Df. 2. All that Df. 2 requires is that the
 beliefs of an omniscient being encompass all and
 only truths ?nothing is said regarding the
 justification with which such beliefs are held or
 the grounds on which such beliefs are acquired,
 and nothing in Df. 2 strictly requires that an om?
 niscient being actually know anything. Omnis?
 cience in the sense of Df. 2, then, despite elegantly
 circumventing the problem of false divine beliefs,
 brings us no closer to an adequate characterization
 of divine knowledge.
 Here we might add a clause specifying justified
 belief:
 Df. 3. x is omniscient = df for all p, p is true
 IFF: x believes that/? and x is justified in believ?
 ing that p.
 Here "for all p" is a universal quantifier which
 binds all "/?'s" that follow it, and "IFF" rather than
 "and" is the main connective of the definiens.
 An omniscient being in the sense of Df. 3 can?
 not hold false beliefs, and moreover cannot hold
 beliefs from mere caprice or without justification.
 If justified true belief were knowledge, Df. 3
 would be the answer to our difficulties. But of
 course knowledge is not merely justified true
 belief. What Df. 3 leaves open, then, is the un?
 comfortable possibility that God, although
 justified in believing all and only true proposi?
 tions, does not know them?just as the individuals
 of Gettier's examples, although justified in believ?
 ing certain propositions, cannot be said to know
 them.7 Df. 3 guarantees only that God stands to
 true propositions in general as Gettier's Smith
 stands to "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is
 in Barcelona," and that clearly will not do as an
 adequate account of the epistemic excellence of
 divinity.
 Here I would suggest Df. 4:
 Df. 4. x is omniscient = df for all p, p is true
 IFF x believes that p, AND x believes that p IFF
 x knows that p.
 The "for all p" governs all that follows it, and the
 definiens is a conjunction of two biconditionals,
 with "AND" as its main connective.
 Df. 4 succeeds, I think, where Df. 1 through Df.
 3 did not. An omniscient being in the sens? of Df.
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 4 holds no false beliefs and holds no beliefs in a
 manner which would not fully qualify as knowl?
 edge. A unified account of this sort, moreover,
 seems clearly preferable to a strategy of retaining
 unmodified a definition such as Df. 1 and invent?
 ing additional epistemic attributes in order to
 avoid difficulties of false or contradictory beliefs.
 In what follows I will use "omniscient" in the
 sense of Df. 4. All that will be crucial for my use
 of the term, however, will be that an omniscient
 being believe all and only truths ?a characteristic
 which would have to be attributed to a traditional
 God in any case, whether by means of a single
 term "omniscient" or by means of a conglomerate
 of epistemic attributes.
 II. Paradoxes of Omniscience: God and the Liar
 It appears that there can be no omniscient be?
 ing.
 For suppose that some being?God, let us
 say?is omniscient. And consider:
 1. God believes that (1) is false,8
 what we might call the Divine Liar.
 At this juncture we might suppose either that (1)
 is true or that (1) is false, leaving more sophis?
 ticated suppositions to be dealt with in due course.
 Suppose first, then, that (1) is true. On that sup?
 position, as (1) maintains, God believes that (1) is
 false. But we are supposing that (1) is true. So if
 (1) is true, God holds a false belief, and thus is not
 omniscient in the sense carved out in the preceding
 section. If (1) is true, moreover, there must be a
 truth which God does not know. For if (1) is true,
 then God believes that (1) is false, and if God does
 not hold contradictory beliefs He cannot also
 believe that (1) is true. But our supposition is that
 (1) is true, so there is a truth ?that (1) is
 true?which God does not believe and hence does
 not know. If (1) is true, God is not omniscient.
 Suppose instead, then, that (1) is false. On this
 supposition, since (1) maintains that God believes
 that (1) is false, it is false that God believes that (1)
 is false. It is not the case, in other words, that God
 believes that (1) is false. But we have assumed that
 (1) is false, and thus there is a truth ?that (1) is
 false?which God does not believe and hence does
 not know. So if (1) is false God is not omniscient
 either.
 If (1) is either true or false, God is not omnis?
 cient. But of course God is not alone in this
 respect; any being one might name can be shown
 to be less than omniscient simply by substituting
 the name of such a being for 'God' in the argument
 above. Thus there can be no omniscient being.
 As will no doubt have occurred to the reader,
 one might attempt to escape the paradox by pro?
 posing that (1) is neither true nor false ?a
 response clearly in the tradition of truth value gap
 treatments of the Liar.9
 Can one escape the argument against omnis?
 cience by proposing that (1) is neither true nor
 false? It appears not. For if (1) is neither true nor
 false, then God ?specified as omniscient?knows
 that (1) is neither true nor false. It cannot be, then,
 that God believes that (1) is false. But (1) specifies
 that God does believe that (1) is false. So (1) must
 be false. If (1) is false, however, then it is not the
 case that God believes that (1) is false. Here as
 before, then, there is a truth which escapes God's
 knowledge?that (1) is false. And here again we
 would have to conclude that God is not omnis?
 cient.
 Truth value gaps, then, do not appear to offer
 any escape. On the assumption that (1) is true,
 false, or neither true nor false, there can be no om?
 niscient being.
 We might get the same result by offering a
 variation of the argument in which (2) takes the
 place of (1):
 2. God believes that (2) is not true.
 (2) is to (1), of course, as the Strengthened Liar
 is to the Liar. If (2) is assumed either true or false,
 we get the same result as before: it cannot be that
 God is omniscient. Suppose then that (2) is neither
 true nor false. Will this offer an escape? No. For if
 (2) is neither true nor false, then of course it is not
 true. Since God is omniscient, He must believe all
 truths, and so must believe that (2) is not true. But
 that God believes that (2) is not true is precisely
 what (2) asserts, so it must be that (2) is true after
 all. But if (2) is true, God holds a false belief? for,
 as (2) maintains, he believes that (2) is not true.
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 There is also a truth that escapes God's knowl?
 edge?that (2) is true. Thus God is not omniscient.
 Here, for good measure, is a third variation on
 the paradox of omniscience:
 An omniscient being, as defined above, believes
 all and only truths. Let us suppose that there is
 such a being, and let us refer to his set of
 beliefs?the complete set of what he believes ?as
 set B.
 Now consider:
 3. (3) is not a member of set B.
 Is (3), or is it not, a member of the set B of
 beliefs of an omniscient being?
 If (3) is not a member of the set, then it must be
 a member of the set. For if it is not a member of
 the set, then it is true?it asserts merely that it is
 not a member?and the beliefs B of an omniscient
 being include all truths.
 If (3) is a member of the set, on the other hand,
 it cannot be. For if (3) is a member of the set of
 beliefs of an omniscient being, since an omniscient
 being believes only truths, (3) must be true. But (3)
 asserts that it is not a member of such a set, so if
 true, must not be a member. Another way of mak?
 ing the point is this. If (3) is a member of the set,
 then (3) is false, for it asserts the contrary. The set
 of beliefs of an omniscient being, however, con?
 tains only truths, and so (3) cannot be a member
 of that set.
 The assumption of an omniscient being leads to
 contradiction, then, whether we assume (3) to be a
 member of set B or not. Thus there can be no om?
 niscient being. Or so it appears.
 III. Paradoxes of Possible Worlds
 It is perhaps worth noting that an argument
 quite similar to the third variation above can be
 offered against a common notion of possible
 worlds, and in particular against a common con?
 ception of an actual world.
 Possible worlds are quite routinely introduced
 either as maximal consistent sets of proposi?
 tions?proposition-saturated sets to which no fur?
 ther proposition can be added without pr?cipit?t
 ing inconsistency?or as some sort of fleshed-out
 correlates to such sets. The actual world, on such
 an account, is that maximal consistent set of prop?
 ositions all members of which actually obtain?a
 maximal and consistent set of all and only (actual)
 truths ?or is an appropriately fleshed out cor?
 relate to such a set.10
 Let us refer to the maximal consistent set which
 belongs to the actual world, then ?to our
 world ?as A. And consider:
 4. (4) is not a member of set A.
 Is (4), or is it not, a member of set Al
 If (4) is not a member of set A, then it must be.
 For in that case (4) is true, since (4) asserts that it is
 not a member, and A contains all (actual) truths.
 If (4) is a member of set A, on the other hand, it
 must not be. For if (4) were a member of A, it
 would be false?(4) asserts that it is not a member.
 A, however, includes only truths, so it cannot be
 that it includes (4).
 It seems, then, that there can be no "actual
 world," either in the sense of a maximal consistent
 set A of all and only (actual) truths, or in the sense
 of something which somehow corresponds to such
 a set. For were there such a set, (4) would either be
 included as a member of it would not. Either sup?
 position, however, appears to lead to contradic?
 tion.
 The actual world is not the only victim here,
 however, for the notion of possible worlds in
 general seems susceptible to this type of paradox.
 Consider any possible world b and its correspond?
 ing maximal consistent set of propositions D?the
 set of all and only those propositions which would
 have obtained if b had been actual. And consider:
 5. (5) is not a member of D.
 Now is (5) a member of set ?>?of that set of
 propositions which would have obtained had b
 been actual ?or is it not?
 Suppose first that (5) is a member of D. Then it
 must not be, by the following reasoning. If (5) is a
 member of D, then had b been actual, (5) would
 have obtained. But in that case (5) ?as (5) main?
 tains?would not have been a member of D. So
 had b been actual, (5) would not have been a
 member of the set D of all propositions which ob
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 tained. Had b been actual, in other words, (5)
 would not have obtained. Since D is the set of all
 and only propositions which would have obtained
 had b been actual, and since (5) would not have
 obtained had b been actual, it must be that (5) is
 not a member of D.
 Let us suppose then that (5) is not a member of
 D. If so, then had b been actual, (5) would not
 have obtained, since all propositions which would
 have obtained had b been actual are members of
 D. If b had been actual, then, (5) would not have
 been a member of the set D of propositions which
 then obtained. But what (5) maintains is that it is
 not a member of D, so had b been actual, (5)
 would have been true?(5) would have obtained.
 Since D includes all propositions which would
 have obtained had b been actual, it must be that
 (5) is a member of D after all.
 Either supposition, then?that (5) is or is not a
 member of Z>?leads to contradiction on the
 assumption that there is a possible world b. But b
 was introduced as any arbitrary possible world.
 Thus it appears that there can be no possible
 worlds.
 It should not come as too much of a surprise
 that the "actual world" (or possible worlds in
 general) may face difficulties similar to those that
 can be raised against omniscience. These are, after
 all, largely correlative notions. That which would
 be known in omniscience is that which would ob?
 tain in the actual world?omniscience is the
 epistemic correlate to a metaphysical notion of the
 actual world. Viewed from the other side, the ac?
 tual world would be the metaphysical instantiation
 of all that exists epistemically in omniscience. For
 every p, p would be a member of set A ? would
 obtain in the actual world?if and only if it were
 also a member of set B?were it among the beliefs
 of an omniscient being.
 There can be no actual world just as there can
 be no omniscient being, then, and for much the
 same reasons. Or so it appears.
 IV. The Obvious Reply?
 The paradoxes of omniscience and of possible
 worlds presented above are clearly close relatives
 of the paradox of the Liar. A quite plausible reply
 in each case?perhaps the obvious reply?is ap?
 propriately borrowed from replies to the Liar.
 The most common approach to the Liar is an at?
 tempt to formulate adequate constraints on the
 range of sentences over which values of "true" and
 "false," or these and some third value, will be
 allowed to apply.11 The challenge facing such at?
 tempts is effectively to exclude as unacceptable the
 Liar sentence and all its troublesome variations,
 and yet at the same time not to exclude apparently
 innocuous cases of self-reference or fundamental
 theorems of, say, set theory and recursion
 theory.12 The standard sorrow of such attempts is
 that they either exclude the unforgiveable or tend
 to fall victim to some overlooked form of the Liar,
 often a variation cooked up in terms of their own
 categories.13
 There is another approach to the Liar that I
 want to draw on here, however, an approach less
 beloved of sentential logicians but perhaps more
 appealing to philosophers of language of a certain
 stripe. This second approach is to insist that it is
 not sentences which bear truth values at all, but
 rather propositions?those ghostly quasi-linguistic
 somethings mysteriously participated in, or repre?
 sented by, or expressed in ordinary sentences.14
 Consider the virtues of a propositional ap?
 proach to the Liar. The standard Liar sentence is
 (6):
 6. (6) is false.
 The Strengthened Liar is (7):
 7. (7) is not true.
 To claim that (6) is either true or false, of course,
 seems to lead to contradiction. To claim that (7) is
 true, false, or neither true nor false seems to lead
 to the same unfortunate result.
 What a propositional account allows one to say,
 however, is that neither (6) nor (7) expresses a
 proposition. And this seems to be enough to stop
 effectively the line of argument crucial to presen?
 tations of the Liar and its variations.
 Consider (7), for example. As long as one sticks
 to one's guns in maintaining that (7) expresses no
 proposition, one can resist going on to say?as
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 Standard presentations require?that (7) then does
 have a truth value after all because of what "it
 says." If (7) expresses no proposition, there simply
 is nothing that (7) "says," or "asserts," or main?
 tains to be the case. So it is not the case that "(7) is
 true because it says it is not true, and since it ex?
 presses no proposition it is neither true nor false,"
 nor is it the case that "since (7) is true, and says it
 is not true, it is not true," etc. All such patterns of
 argument can be rejected. On a propositional ap?
 proach there is nothing which (6) or (7) or any
 other Liar-like sentence says, and thus all presen?
 tations of Liar-like paradoxes which rely at any
 point on a claim as to what the sentence at issue
 says?and that appears to include them all ?are
 effectively blocked.
 A propositional approach to the Liar is not
 without its difficulties, some of which will be con?
 sidered in the next section. What I want to point
 out here, however, is that a similar propositional
 line might be taken in attempting to save a doc?
 trine of omniscience and of an omniscient God.
 The basic definition of omniscience with which
 we have been working throughout, it will be
 remembered, is Df. 4:
 Df. 4. x is omniscient = df for all p, p is true
 IFF x believes thatp, ANDx believes that/? IFF
 x knows that p.
 A propositional account of omniscience of the
 sort I have in mind simply insists ?as some have
 insisted anyway?that the "for all p" of Df. 4 be
 read as "for all propositions p." The supposed
 abstractness, otherworldliness, or even ghostliness
 of propositions, after all, hold few terrors for one
 already committed to a traditional God.
 An approach of this sort has much to recom?
 mend it. Consider again (1):
 1. God believes that (1) is false.
 If we insist that (1) expresses no proposition, we
 can resist the claim ?a claim crucial to the
 paradoxes above?that (1) is either true or false
 because of what it "says," "asserts," or maintains
 to be the case. If we insist that omniscience be
 defined along the lines of Df. 4 with an emphasis
 on propositions, moreover, it appears that the
 possibility of omniscience and of an omniscient
 God will be safe from any problems posed by (1).
 Omniscience will also be safe from any prob?
 lems posed by (3):
 3. (3) is not a member of set B.
 Set B, it will be remembered, is taken as
 designating the set of all beliefs of an omniscient
 being. If we insist that omniscience be understood
 in terms of propositions, and if we insist that (3)
 expresses no proposition, then (3) will pose no
 more of a threat for the possibility of omniscience
 than did (1). Because (3) is not itself a proposition,
 and does not express a proposition, neither (3) nor
 anything it expresses is a member of the set B of
 propositions believed by an omniscient being. But
 it does not follow, as the paradoxical argument
 would have it, that (3) must then be true, "because
 it says that it is not a member of B." If (3) ex?
 presses no proposition, then there is nothing it
 says, or asserts, or maintains, and so here again a
 crucial step in the paradoxical argument is effec?
 tively blocked.
 A similar emphasis on propositions can be used,
 of course, to defend a notion of possible worlds,
 and of the actual world, against the paradoxes of
 possible worlds presented above.
 Here is was (4) and (5) that caused the trouble;
 4. (4) is not a member of set A,
 5. (5) is not a member of set D,
 where set A was understood as the maximal con?
 sistent set associated with the actual world and set
 D was understood as a maximal consistent set
 associated with a possible world b.
 If it is emphasized that possible worlds are to be
 understood as maximal consistent sets o? proposi?
 tions, however, or as fleshed-out correlates to sets
 of propositions, and if we also insist that (4) and
 (5) express no propositions, these will cease to be a
 threat. (4) and (5) are not members of sets A and
 D because A and D are sets exclusively of proposi?
 tions. But since (4) and (5) express no proposi?
 tions, it does not follow from this that they
 somehow obtain or would obtain, or are or would
 be members of A or D, because of what they say.
 Since (4) and (5) express no propositions, there is
 nothing that they say.
 But propositional approaches also have a few
 problems.
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 V. Problems with Propositions
 A propositional approach to the Liar faces a
 number of difficulties of its own, and these can be
 expected to carry over to a similar propositional
 strategy with regard to omniscience. I do not think
 that these difficulties are decisive in either case?a
 propositional approach seems to me the most
 plausible concerning either the Liar or the para?
 doxes of omniscience. But such difficulties cer?
 tainly do deserve to be taken into account.
 The most obvious difficulty of a propositional
 account, in any context, is the inevitable obscurity
 and perhaps the dubious intelligibility of a notion
 of "propositions." What could propositions bel
 And how are such things, if things they be, to be
 either identified or individuated?
 A second difficulty is that a propositional ap?
 proach is in some ways too easy a reply to the Liar
 and similar paradoxes, at least with regard to
 some of the questions that many who have taken
 on the Liar have tried to answer. Surely it is not
 enough merely to say that (1) or (3) or (4) or (5)
 does not express a proposition, for we will also
 want to know why. What is it about such sen?
 tences that keeps them from expressing a proposi?
 tion, or that deprives them of a proposition to ex?
 press? A propositional account alone gives us no
 general theory of why certain sentences fail to ex?
 press propositions, and any supplementary theory
 designed to fill this need, it appears, would require
 all the complexities and would face all the dif?
 ficulties of the sentential approach mentioned at
 the beginning of the preceding section.15
 Both of these are serious problems. But they are
 not problems of as serious a type as they might be.
 A propositional approach leaves plenty of embar?
 rassing questions unanswered, and this doesn't say
 much for an appeal to propositions. But the alter?
 natives to a propositional account seem to face
 even worse difficulties. Sentential approaches, for
 example, regularly run aground on some over?
 looked Liar-like sentence, often concocted in
 terms of the categories of that particular ap?
 proach, for which no appropriate value can be
 assigned without contradiction. If the alternative
 is paradox and contradiction, surely, the embar?
 rassing questions of a propositional approach are
 to be preferred.
 Consider also another difficulty for proposi?
 tional approaches?that of the Propositional Liar:
 8. (8) expresses no true proposition.
 Is (8) true or false? If true, one might argue, it is
 false, for (8) itself maintains that it is not true. If
 false, it appears, it is true?for then, as (8) main?
 tains, it expresses no true proposition. We might
 propose, as a third alternative, that (8) is neither
 true nor false. If it is neither true nor false,
 however, it is in particular not true ?it expresses
 no true proposition. But all that (8) says is that it
 expresses no true proposition, so it must be true
 after all. But if (8) is true, as already argued, it
 must be false....
 A propositional approach to (8), of course, will
 attempt to block the pattern of reasoning common
 to all of these options by insisting simply that (8)
 expresses no proposition.
 Such a position at least looks awkward with
 respect to the Propositional Liar, however. If (8)
 expresses no proposition, then it of course ex?
 presses no true proposition. The partisan of prop?
 ositions must hold, then, that (9) is true:
 9. (8) expresses no true proposition.
 Now a propositionalist is not forced at this point
 to say that (8) is true after all, on the supposed
 grounds that (9) is true and "says just what (8)
 says." The consistent propositionalist will main?
 tain instead that, despite appearances, there is all
 the difference in the world between (8) and (9). (8)
 expresses no proposition, and so of course carries
 no truth value. (9), on the other hand?although
 identical to (8) word for word and different only
 in its numbering ? does express a proposition and,
 moreover, expresses a truth.
 This is not an inconsistent position. But it must
 be admitted that it is at least a somewhat uncom?
 fortable one?it does not seem, at least initially,
 that there should be as great a difference between
 (8) and (9) as the partisan of propositions is forced
 to claim.
 The propositionalist defender of omniscience
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 will offer a similar account for (10), with a similar?
 ly uncomfortable result:
 10. God believes that (10) expresses no true
 proposition.
 Unless it is stopped, the claims that (10) is true,
 false, or neither true nor false will lead to paradox
 just as did (1) and (3). The propositionalist
 defender of omniscience, of course, will avoid the
 paradox by claiming that (10) expresses no prop?
 osition. If so, however, (10) expresses no true
 proposition, and God?since He believes all
 truths ?will believe that (10) expresses no true
 proposition.
 The propositional defender of omniscience
 must hold, in other words, that (11) is true:
 11. God believes that (10) expresses no true
 proposition.
 But he must also hold that (10)?identical to (11)
 word for word, and different only in its number?
 ing?expresses no proposition at all, much less a
 true one.
 A propositional defense of omniscience, then,
 like a propositional response to the Liar, is at least
 to some extent an awkward or uncomfortable
 strategy. But the alternatives may be seriously
 worse. Despite the difficulties noted, then, a prop?
 ositional approach may be the best available
 response to the Liar and the best option open to a
 defender of omniscience.
 VI. Essential Indexicals and Omniscience
 Let me now raise a set of problems for omnis?
 cience, and concerning propositions, which are
 not related to the Liar.
 Consider a case borrowed from John Perry:16
 I follow a trail of spilled sugar around and
 around a tall aisle in the supermarket, in search of
 the shopper who is making a mess. Suddenly I
 realize that the trail of sugar I have been following
 is spilling from a torn sack in my cart, and that /
 am the culprit?/ am making a mess.
 What it is that I come to know at that
 point ?what I know when I come to know that
 12. I am making a mess
 ? is traditional regarded as the proposition that I
 am making a mess. The proposition thus known,
 moreover, is traditionally regarded as the same
 proposition as that expressed by:
 13. Patrick Grim is making a mess.17
 There is the following difference between (12) and
 (13) on the traditional view. / can express the
 proposition at issue in (12) and (13) by using (12),
 with its indexical "I." Other cannot, and are
 forced instead to use some mode of reference such
 as the "Patrick Grim" of (13). But this is hardly a
 crucial difference. On the traditional view the
 same proposition is expressed in each case, and
 what I know or express in knowing or expressing
 (12) is just what others know or express in know?
 ing or expressing (13).
 As Perry, David Lewis, and Roderick Chisholm
 have argued, however, this seems to be much too
 simple an account of objects of knowledge, and in
 particular of what it is that I know in knowing
 (12). Contrary to the traditional view, it appears,
 the "I" of (12) is an essential indexical ?essential
 to what it is that I know in knowing (12).
 The argument is as follows: When I stop myself
 short in the supermarket, gather up my broken
 sack, and start to tidy up, this may be quite fully
 explained by saying that I realized (or came to
 believe, or came to know) that I was making a
 mess ?what I express by (12). But it cannot be ful?
 ly explained, or at least as fully explained, by say?
 ing that I realized that Patrick Grim was making a
 mess ?what is expressed by (13). In order to give
 the realization that Patrick Grim was making a
 mess the full explanatory force of the realization
 that / was making a mess, in fact, we would have
 to add that I know that / am Patrick Grim. And
 that, of course, is to reintroduce the indexical.
 It thus appears that what I come to know when I
 come to know (12) is not what I or anyone else
 might know in knowing (13). For my knowledge
 of (12) has an explanatory power that my
 knowledge of (13) does not.
 Let us apply all this to questions of omnis?
 cience.
 If God, in being omniscient or all-knowing, is to
 know all that is known or all that can be known,
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 He must know what I know in knowing (12):
 12. I am making a mess.
 But this, it appears, God cannot know. As argued
 above, the indexical "I" is essential to what I know
 in knowing (12). But only I can use that "I" to in?
 dex me.
 God can, of course, know (13):
 13. Patrick Grim is making a mess.
 But this does not amount to what I know in know?
 ing (12).
 It should be noted that no appeal to de re belief
 will be of help to omniscience here.18 For what I
 know, or come to know, in knowing (12),
 12. I am making a mess,
 is not what I or others would know in knowing,
 say (14) de re of me:
 14. He is making a mess.
 Consider, for example, a case in which I see
 myself and my messy trail of sugar in a fish-eye
 mirror at the end of an aisle. I might then come to
 believe (14) de re of the man in the mirror ?of
 myself, as it happens?just as anyone else viewing
 me might come to believe (14) de re of me. But I
 would not thereby know what I know in knowing
 (12), for I still might not realize that it was me in
 the mirror. A knowledge de re of me and my mess,
 then, still falls short of what I know in knowing
 (12) de se.
 Whatever treatment is offered for the paradoxes
 of omniscience proposed in earlier sections, then,
 a doctrine of omniscience or of an omniscient God
 cannot be defended against essential indexicals. If
 there is some self-conscious being other than God,
 what that being knows de se cannot be known by
 God, and thus it cannot be that God is omniscient.
 Or so it seems.
 VII. Propositional Omniscience and Essential
 Indexicals
 How much of a problem do essential indexicals
 really pose for omniscience?
 Consider again the examples appealed to above.
 What I know in knowing (12),
 12. I am making a mess,
 it was argued, does not amount to what God or
 anyone else knows in knowing (13), or even (14) de
 re of me:
 13. Patrick Grim is making a mess.
 14. He is making a mess.
 Even if we accept that something different is
 known in these cases, however, how much of a
 threat this poses for omniscience still depends on
 precisely what it is that we take to be known in
 each case. It also depends on what further
 refinements we might choose to make in a notion
 of omniscience.
 We might treat all that is known in knowing
 (12), (13), and (14) as a matter of propositional
 knowledge. All that I know in knowing (12), on
 such a view, is a particular proposition. All that
 others know in knowing (13) or (14), given the
 argument of the preceding section, is some dif?
 ferent proposition. This is of course to abandon
 the traditional claim that the same proposition is
 at stake in, say, (12) and (13). On this view I alone
 could know or express the proposition I express by
 means of (12), and on this view essential indexicals
 such as "I" would quite generally indicate proposi?
 tions to which the speaker alone has expressive or
 epistemic access.19
 Perhaps more plausibly, however, we might
 choose instead to allow for an element of non
 propositional knowledge. We might choose to re?
 tain the traditional claim that the same proposi?
 tion is known in knowing, say, (12) and (13), but
 propose that there is also something more that is
 known in the case of (12) ?some additional non
 propositional element above and beyond the prop?
 osition that (12) and (13) have in common.
 If we adopt the first view, and hold that I know
 a different proposition in knowing (12) than is
 known in knowing (13) or (14) ?or if we hold that
 what is known de se in (12) is some additional
 proposition to which I alone have access?then
 clearly neither God nor any other being distinct
 from me knows all propositions. On this view
 propositional omniscience would have to be re?
 jected, for on this view, in any world in which
 there is more than one self-conscious being, there
 will be propositions unknown and unknowable by
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 any proposed being: those propositions known or
 knowable only de se by some other being. If prop?
 ositional omniscience is rejected, moreover, it is
 unclear what is left for "omniscience" to amount
 to. This first view, then, can hardly be recom?
 mended to the traditional theist or to the defender
 of omniscience.
 The alternative, as outlined above, is to main?
 tain that the difference between what is known in
 knowing (12) and (13), or in knowing (12) and
 (14), is not a propositional difference. If one
 adopts the view that what I know in knowing (12)
 that is not known in knowing (13) or (14) is
 something rtcw-propositional, above and beyond
 the proposition they have in common, then one
 can maintain the possibility of a propositionally
 omniscient God.20 There will still be something
 that I know in knowing (12) that God cannot
 know. But that something will on this view be
 Azo/2-propositional, and so will pose no threat to
 God's propositional omniscience.
 But there is still a price to pay. On this view
 God, although propositionally omniscient, clearly
 could not be said to be all-knowing. If there is
 more to be known in heaven and earth than prop?
 ositions, then propositional omniscience by no
 means guarantees that its possessor knows all that
 is or can be known. Some of what is known,
 moreover, is what is known de se by me and by
 other finite creatures. Since no being distinct from
 other finite creatures can know what they know de
 se, there clearly is no all-knowing being.21
 Essential indexicals do not pose a fatal difficul?
 ty for omniscience or for an omniscient God,
 then, at least if one is careful to limit one's claims
 to propositional omniscience and if examples of
 knowledge de se are dealt with in terms of non
 propositional knowledge.22 But essential index?
 icals do seem to show the impossibility of defend?
 ing an all-knowing God.
 VIII. Conclusion
 I have tried above to call attention to two sets of
 difficulties regarding omniscience that have
 generally been overlooked: Liar-like paradoxes of
 omniscience, and problems of essential indexicals.
 I regard these as serious problems, and consider
 their neglect to have been undeserved. But I have
 not shown, and have not attempted to show, that
 these are somehow fatal difficulties for a notion of
 omniscience or of an omniscient God. Indeed I
 think they are not. Both sets of difficulties can be
 avoided by careful adherence to a notion of mere
 propositional omniscience, together with impor?
 tant auxiliary claims in other areas: that certain
 Liar-like sentences express no propositions, for
 example, and that knowledge de se is non
 propositional in important respects. Such a posi?
 tion is still not without its costs, but then few
 philosophical positions are.
 Mere propositional omniscience is perhaps a
 more guarded claim concerning divine knowledge
 than is traditional.23 But it is in the tradition of at?
 tributing omniscience of at least some sort to God,
 and has the distinct advantage of escaping,
 however narrowly, the neglected but important
 problems posed above.
 State University of New York at Stony Brook Received May 4,1982
 NOTES
 1. Recent discussions of note include chap. 3 of Peter Geach, Providence and Evil (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977);
 section II of Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); and chapter 10 of Richard Swin?
 burne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
 2. In addition to Geach, Kenny, and Swinburne, see esp. Robert Merrihew Adams, "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of
 Evil," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 14 (1977), pp. 109-17.
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 3. The important pieces here are A. N. Prior, "The Formalities of Omniscience," Philosophy, Vol. 37 (1962), pp. 114-29; Nor?
 man Kretzmann, "Omniscience and Immutability," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 63 (1966), pp. 409-21; and Hector-Neri
 Casta?eda, "Omniscience and Indexical Reference," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64 (1967), pp. 203-10. All of these are reprinted
 in Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. by Baruch Brody (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), and are discussed
 in Kenny and Swinburne.
 4. See David Lewis, "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 88 (1979), pp. 513-43, and John Perry,
 "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," Nous, Vol. 13 (1979), pp. 3-21. Both of these are reprinted in The Philosopher's An?
 nual, Vol. Ill, ed. by David L. Boyer, Patrick Grim, and John T. Sanders (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Pub. Co., 1980). See
 also Roderick Chisholm, The First Person (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1981).
 5. Geach, pp. 40, 43; Prior, p. 115; Swinburne, p. 162; James F. Ross, Philosophical Theology (New York: Bobbs-Merrill,
 1969), p. 214; William E. Mann, "The Divine Attributes," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 12 (1975), pp. 151-59, see
 153-54. See also Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1980), p. 91, and James
 E. Tomberlin and Frank McGuinness, "God, Evil, and the Free Will Defense," Religious Studies, Vol. 13 (1977), pp. 455-75, see
 472. Some of the definitions offered vary stylistically, but on closer examination amount to no more than Df. 1.
 6. Nelson Pike offers a somewhat different definition in terms of belief in God and Timelessness (London: Routledge and Kegan
 Paul, 1970), p. 54. Pike's account is "N(*)(P)(if x is omniscient, then if P, x believes that P)," which uses only a conditional rather
 than a biconditional. Pike's definition is thus not equivalent to Df. 2, and fails to exclude the possibility of an omniscient being
 holding false beliefs.
 7. This reference is of course to Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?," Analysis, Vol. 23 (1963), pp. 121-23.
 8. "Personal paradoxes" such as (1) were first pointed out to me years ago by David Boyer.
 9. See esp. Brian Skyrms, "Return of the Liar: Three-Valued Logic and the Concept of Truth," American Philosophical
 Quarterly, Vol. 7 (1970), pp. 153-61, and the excellent collection The Paradox of the Liar, ed. by Robert L. Martin (Reseda,
 Calif.: Ridgeview Pub. Co., 1978). Susan Haack offers a very sound discussion of Russell's, Tarski's, and Kripke's approaches in
 Philosophy of Logics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 135-51.
 10. See for example Plantinga's treatment of worlds in terms of "books" in God, Freedom, and Evil, pp. 35-44, and The Nature of
 Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 44-69.
 11. This general type of approach has resulted in some intricate and impressive proposals. See esp. Bas C. van Fraassen, "Truth
 and Paradoxical Consequences," in Robert L. Martin, pp. 13-23.
 12. See John F. Post, "Shades of the Liar," Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 2 (1973), 370-85, and "Propositions, Possible
 Languages, and the Liar's Revenge," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 25 (1974), pp. 223-34.
 13. See esp. Alan Ross Anderson, "St. Paul's Epistle to Titus," in Robert L. Martin, pp. 1-11.
 14. See esp. Newton Garver, "The Range of Truth and Falsity," in Robert L. Martin, pp. 121-26. A further bibliography of this
 position is given in Susan Haack, p. 140.
 15. This difficulty for propositional approaches to the Liar is well put in Robert L. Martin's "Reply to Donnellan and Garver," in
 Robert L. Martin, pp. 127-34. See also Susan Haack, p. 140.
 16. "The Problem of the Essential Indexical." See also David Lewis, "Attitudes De Dicto and De S?" and Roderick Chisholm, The
 First Person.
 17. Kenny refers to propositions in this traditional sense as "items of information," and reserves the term "proposition" for
 something quite different?something counted by counting synonymous sentences, such that "I am tired" and "You are tired"
 must express different "propositions" (pp. 44-45). Susan Haack employs a similar usage (pp. 75-78).
 18. On a view such as Frege's, de re belief itself causes difficulties for a propositional account. See Perry, pp. 161-65.
 19. Such a view is evidently held by Frege in "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," tr. by A. M. and Marcelle Quinton, Mind, Vol.
 65 (1956), pp. 289-311, reprinted in Philosophical Logic, ed. by P. F. Strawson (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 17-38.
 This view is explicitly discussed by Perry.
 20. This seems to be the view taken by Lewis concerning what is known in cases such as (13) and concerning omniscience. See
 Lewis, pp. 520-21.
 21. There may also be other and simpler reasons to reject the notion of an all-knowing being, however. See for example Michael
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 Martin, "A Disproof of God's Existence," Darshana International, Vol. 10 (1970), pp. 22-26.
 22. Propositional omniscience cannot be taken as an adequate characterization of divine knowledge, however; God must have
 some appropriately excellent degree of rtow-propositional knowledge as well.
 23. It is clearly much more guarded than the claims for divine knowledge that appear in Aquinas, for example.
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